EOL 469: Legal Basis of Educational Practice

David M. Stone, University Laboratory High School, Urbana, IL USA

Cases Dealing with Illinois Public School Residency Determination

The four court cases outlined below center around the issue of Illinois public school residency determination. Like most case law regarding determination of public K-12 school residency, all of these cases predate the current Illinois Residency Statute which states explicitly the conditions of consideration in determining residency, thus relegating these cases largely to a role of academic interest.  

Kraut v. Rachford (1977)
Issues: The issues here are situation-specific.

1. Was Anthony Kraut entitled to resident status in the school district in which his aunt resided?
2. Were his rights of due process violated in his removal from Homewood-Flossmoor High School ?
3. If so, was Anthony Kraut due damages for violation of his rights of due process?

Facts: Anthony's father lost his job, causing the family to move from Milwaukee to Flossmoor, IL. Financial concerns led to Anthony's parents moving in with Anthony's uncle, while the children lived next door with Anthony's aunt, Natalie Bartusiewicz. The parents divorced and Anthony's mother moved to an apartment in Chicago Heights. Anthony and his siblings were placed in his mother's custody, though she did not possess the financial resources to maintain the children, who remained with Bartusiewicz. Anthony's mother subsequently remarried to a man who expressed a desire that the children remain with the aunt. Mother contributed support, though children remained with the aunt. Anthony was registered for his freshman year at Homewood-Flossmoor High School (H-F) using both his mother's and aunt's signatures and a statement that Bartusiewicz was his guardian. Immediately prior to the start of his sophomore year, Anthony's mother was informed by Rachford that there was reason to believe Anthony was not a resident of the district and Anthony was dropped from the enrollment of H-F, though she was told he could appeal the decision. The appeal was put forth immediately, Rachford deciding that the placement was solely to attend H-F. Anthony attended Bloom Township H.S. tuition-free during his sophomore year. A court decision the following summer found Anthony to be a resident of Flossmoor and he returned to H-F to complete his junior and senior years.

Holding:

1. Yes, the court believed control and custody were relinquished by Anthony's mother beyond the degree to which necessarily and naturally resulted from the plaintiff's physical proximity to his aunt.
2. No, communication from the school occurred appropriately and involved the appropriate individuals. In the case there was no evidence of malice or impartiality in school district actions.
3. Because Anthony Kraut's rights were not determined to have been violated the damage issue was not considered.

Court Reasoning in the Residency Decision:

1. Illinois School Code conferred upon Anthony an interest in attending a school on a tuition-free basis and that the retention of such a benefit is protected by the requirements of due process of law.
2. H-F processed Anthony's course enrollment form for the 1974-75 school year over his nonresident mother's signature rather than that of his resident aunt on March 18, 1974. On August 1, 1974, H-F accepted the payment of his fees for his sophomore year.
3. No further communication was received from H-F until August 30, 1974, when defendant notified Anthony's mother that he was dropped from enrollment.
4. Under these circumstances... the actions of H-F in allowing him to attend on a tuition-free basis during his freshman year and further allowing him to proceed to final registration for his sophomore year, which encompassed a time period during which his living conditions remained constant, fostered an objective expectancy in his continuation at H-F on the same basis as before.
5. Therefore, the court holds that plaintiff was entitled to due process protection of his interest in continuing to attend H-F as a resident student.

Herscher Community Unit School Dist N. 2 v. Kankakee School District No. 111 (1981)
Issue: Is a child's physical residence the ultimate determining factor in determining residency for school purposes?
Facts: Dispute between three school districts. At issue is the legal residency of a handicapped child, Andrew Robertson. Andrew's father, a widower, resides in Bourbonnais. Andrew stays with his adult sister in Kankakee, a separate school district. Both districts lack the special education services for handicapped children that are available in the Herscher School District, the school Andrew attends. Herscher district brought suit against Kankakee district claiming reimbursement for educational services furnished to Andrew. Kankakee district added Bourbonnais district as a third-party defendant. Previously a lower court held that Andrew's legal residence was with his father (Bourbonnais). Bourbonnais School District appealed.  For the most part Andrew lives with his sister, though his father supports him financially, claims Andrew as a dependent for federal income tax purposes and retains legal custody. The Appeals Court affirmed the lower court decision.
Holding: No, a child's physical residence is not the ultimate factor in determining his residence for school purposes. 

Connelly v. Gibbs, 445 N.E. 2d 477 (1st Dist. 1983)
Issue: Is establishment of a secondary family residence sufficient grounds to allow children to attend public school in the secondary residence's public school district free of charge?
Facts: In a lower court decision, Matthew Connelly, a 15-year-old hearing-impaired child brought an action by his parents, James and Laureen Connelly, against Wesley F. Gibbs and Niles Township High School District 219, for damages and for a permanent mandatory injunction requiring that he be enrolled as a resident in the free schools of District 219. A hearing commenced on August 6, 1981, during which the court assessed the issue of residency as "blurred and complicated" by plaintiffs' ownership and dual occupancy of both a condominium in Skokie and a family residence in Chicago. Nonetheless, the court found
Matthew to be a resident of Skokie and issued a permanent mandatory injunction requiring District 219 to provide him with a free and appropriate public special education. District 219 appealed the decision.

In June, 1980 , Matthew Connelly graduated from an elementary school in the Chicago School District. He was designated by that district for placement at Whitney Young High School, a magnet school with a hearing-impaired department. The Connellys were concerned about the lack of vocational training at the designated school and decided they would not send Matthew to the school. Instead, they petitioned High School District 214 in Arlington Heights for Matthew's admission on a tuition basis to a hearing-impaired program conducted at John Hersey High School (Hersey), which was denied. In an effort to achieve residency, the Connelly family purchased a condominium in Skokie with the intent that Matthew and his father would live there during the week and would reside at the Chicago residence with the rest of the family on weekends.

Holding: No, establishment of a secondary family residence is not sufficient grounds to allow children to attend public school in the secondary residence's public school district free of charge.

Court Reasoning:

1. The general rule in Illinois is that the residence of parents is the residence of their children.
2. Conversely, a minor child's dwelling in a school district solely for the purpose of attending public school in the district will not be considered residency in the district for school purposes. (Turner v. Board of Education, 1973).
3. Appellate court held intent to be the critical question in determining residence, and in determining intent a person's acts are to be given more weight than his declarations.
4. There is no question that at the time the Connellys purchased the four-room condominium in Skokie they did not intend that their entire family, or even those remaining at home, would reside there as such would have been physically impossible in a single bedroom unit.
5. The Connellys claimed four of their children as dependents on their 1980 Federal income tax return and Mr. Connelly testified that he still exercised parental control over the two younger children who resided in Chicago during the time he and his wife claimed to be permanent residents of Skokie.
6. Having reviewed the record, we cannot escape the conclusion that the true motivating factor for the Connellys' purchase of the Skokie condominium was to provide their handicapped son with what they perceived to be the best education possible.
7. The court found no justification for upholding the establishment of a second parental residence for school purposes which is only minutes away from the true parental residence.

Israel S. v. Board of Education of Oak Park and River Forest High School Dist. 200, 601 N.E.2d 1264 (1st Dist. 1992).
Issue: Can a school district summarily reject applications for tuition-free enrollment by children who are not residing with their original parents?
Facts: Deborah Owens, Israel S's maternal aunt and a lawyer, filed a suit against the defendant in which she alleged that his rights were violated in consideration of non-tuition paying resident status. Owen's supplied all of the required paperwork for tuition-free resident status consideration (contract for a purchase of a home set for closing and transfer of possession, a copy of the plaintiff's high school transcript; an immunization and health record, an "affidavit of residence" signed by the plaintiff's father, an affidavit of residence signed by Owens stating that the transfer was not for school purposes, and a power of attorney signed by the plaintiff's father, giving Owens complete educational and medical control over the plaintiff and appointing Owens his guardian "in the event one is needed."
The district refused to allow the plaintiff to enroll on either a tuition or tuition-free basis. Owen's was told by the district's residency director that the district rules required her to have legal guardianship of the plaintiff and to have a third-party professional or other governmental agency certify that Israel could not reside with his parents due to impossibility or extreme hardship. Upon being provided that information, the district "could determine that this third-party certification was insufficient." When Owens informed the defendant's director that she did not have legal custody nor a third-party certification, she was told that she could not enroll Israel in the school.

Owens reminded the residency director that such restrictive policies had been ruled improper by Illinois courts and by the Illinois State Board of Education. The district continued to refuse the plaintiff's enrollment. Owens contacted the legal department of the Illinois State Board of Education (ISBE), which sent her various legal opinions and the ISBE's recommended affidavit for establishing residency. An ISBE attorney also told her that the defendant could not exclude the plaintiff for the reasons ascribed and that he would tell that to the defendant's attorney.

Owens went to the defendant with various proofs of residency. The district residency director told her that he could not change the policy and allow her to enroll the Israel. He gave her more affidavits of residency and told her that when the forms were returned, the district assistant superintendent would take the matter up with the district's attorneys.

Owens returned with the notarized affidavits on the defendant's forms and tendered them to the assistant superintendent's secretary. She was told she needed to tender a filed petition for guardianship of a minor, and that this was all he was prepared to do. Because school started the next day Owens had no choice but to file for temporary injunctive relief. Israel was permitted to enroll on a tuition basis pending the outcome of the injunction complaint. Later, Owens tendered to the defendant an additional power of attorney, signed by both parents, giving Owens full "care, custody and control" of the plaintiff; a copy of the deed to Owens' home; and an electric bill of Owens at the address in Oak Park. Owens paid the defendant $ 1,050, which the defendant claimed was the amount of tuition due through September 30. Owens made no additional payments. By letter, Owens requested a waiver of the payment until the injunction suit had been heard. The district did not respond to the letter but told the Israel on October 17 that he could not return the following day.

In October, Judge Richard Curry entered a temporary restraining order permitting the plaintiff to attend on a tuition-free basis. Thus, according to the Owens, "he missed four school days, missed assignments and tests which could not be made up and suffered a loss in his grades, as a result."

The district has cited no case which would support its right to impose a hard-fast rule such as is contained in its policy. The court determined that in promulgating its policy, the district acted beyond the power given it under Turner and Ashley. The court also found that the defendant acted beyond its power when it provided that proof of parental hardship or incapacity may be established only by a statement from a "third-party professional who is qualified to provide information regarding parental incapacity or extreme hardship".

Holding: No, a school district cannot summarily reject applications for tuition-free enrollment by children who are not residing with their original parents.

Created 9/3/99. Last modified 9/4/99.